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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
MAYBFJLL GRIFFITHS,
plaintiff and appellant
vs.
.ARCH1TLUIS BUTTARS
.ARCHIBALD and
J).\ \TID ARCHIBALD,

Respondent's
Brief
Case No. 8135

defendants and respondents.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
'l'he plaintiff, who lives to the East of defendant
1n Clarkston, in Cache County, clailns an easement
by adverse use against defendant. Clarkston is on
the West side of the \-alley, and where the slope
is from the West to the East. During the trial
of the case, the Court sent the jury to view the
premises prior to rendition of the verdict. During
the trial the plaintiff testified ( tr. 41) that she never used the ditch against the will of anyone, and
that she was not using the ditch against the will of
her sister. When the plaintiff closed her testimony a
1notion to dismiss was argued in chambers, and when
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the Court indicated his intention or granting the motion
( tr. 59) plaintiff was granted a motion to re-open for
the purpose further testimony by plaintiff, and when
plaintiff was again on the stand (tr. 61) she changed
the entire nature of her testimony in an attempt to
establish a hostile usage, and testified after having her
attorneys explain the nature of adverse usage ( tr. 63).
After Inuch explanation plaintiff admitted that the adverse and hostile use of the ditch began in 1952 (tr.
71) when the family were trying to settle their Mother':;;
estate, which resulted in several lawsuits in which
plaintiff and defendant were upon opposite sides. Defendant's exhibit "2" is the first notice defendant harl
that her sister, plaintiff, claimed an absolute right
to the use of the ditch. It was because of the nature
of plaintiff's testimony that the jury found that the
use of the ditch had been by permission, and they there-·
fore, found in favor of the defendant (tr. 88). In 194fi
the husband of plaintiff sought permission from a son
of defendant to use the ditch, and other times sought
pern1ission fro In husband of defendant ( tr. 90). The son
remembered these requests back to 1942 (tr. 95). The
ditch in question was put in about 1938 (tr. 101) by an
agreement and bet,veen plaintiff and defendant's husband (tr. 101-102), in the condition it existed just prior
to the trial, although it had been used before, but always by permission, so far as plaintiff is concerned.
The jury understood thoroughly what was meant by the
us~ of the term "hostile", because it was discussed
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as bearing on the question of use by or without

perini~-

sion ( tr. 105). In fact the defendant herself assisted
her sister with the water (tr. 109).
The \Vater \Vas generally used on plaintiff's lot prior
to her purchase of it about 1928 ( tr. 111). Defendant'~
husband stopped plaintiff's use of the ditch in 1952
because the plaintiff had failed to ask his permission
to use it in 1951 ( tr. 115) and because the husband had
lost a right in former years by adverse use, he knew
that if plain tiff used the ditch by permission, plain tiff
could not gain a right by adverse user ( tr. 115). Witness . .t.\.rchibald (husband of defendant) had worked
this property and knew that there \Vas no ditch across
the property prior to 19'38 ( tr. 116). He had rented
both the property of plaintiff and of defendant ( tr. 117)
until plaintiff bought her piece. Each year from 1931
on (the ditch was located in a different place then, and
to the North, in the barnyard of defendant) the plaintiff sought, and was given per1nission to use the ditch.
Mr. Archibald testified: ''And then from '30 up until
'51 he (plaintiff's husband) had my permission to use
that water, and he didn't ask me in '51 so in the spring
of '52 I told him not to use it.'' Q. ''Did he ever tell
you in substance or effect that he had a right to the
use of it~ A. No, he just came and asked me if he could
take the water through. Q. Did he ever use it in any
year except 1951 without coming to see you~ . A... Ever~·
year he asked me" (Tr. 118). In 1946 ~{r. Archibald
plowed up the ditch and plan ted grass, and again l\;1 r.
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Griffiths sought his pern1Iss1on ( tr. 120). It was on
such testin1ony that the jury found that there waH pernlis~ive use, or as put in tbe special verdict "friendly''
use up till 1952, and upon such testimony that the Court
belo\v based his judgment on verdict.
srr_A_TEMENT OF POINTS
RELIED ON TO AFFIRi\'1 THFJ LOWER COlTRT:
RESPONl)~JN'r'S

POINT I. THE c;orri~1.-, DID NOT ERR IN RENDER.
ING JUDGMENT AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF.
POINT II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN SlJBMITTING SPECIAL INTERROGATORY No.3; NOR
DID IT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION No. 1.
POINT III. TIIE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO GI\TE THE INSTRUCTION AS SET
OlT'r IN _A_PP]j"JJ.lL~~NT'S POINT III.
ARG[JMENT-POINT I
At the outset it seems apparent to the writer that
appellant has misconceived the nature of the case as
presented hy her to the lower Court. At the very outset
of the testimony of the plaintiff herself (tr. 34, 35 and
36), she told the Court and jury that the property she
novv O\vned had been irrigated hy ditches running through
respondents' property as long as she could ren1ember
and one of those ditches was exactly the same as she
is seeking to quiet title to ( tr. 35). Q. "Is this the ditch
'vhich you seek to quiet title too? A. Yes, sir. Q.
\\ras the ditch in existence when you purchased your lot?
A. Yes, sir. Q. Was it in existence when you commenced
this action last June~ A. Yes, sir. Q. Has its course
n1aterially changed since 1926 ~ A. No sir.'' To the same
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effeet is the testimony of her husband ( tr. 47).
lt is to be remembered that in the lTtah case of
Cache \,.alley Banking Co., v. Cache Co. Poultry Gr.
Ass'n. 209 P. 2d 251, this Court held exactly opposite
to the contention of the appellant in this case. Said
the Court:
'' rrhe presurnption stated in that rule is that in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, the trier
of fact is required to find that the use was vvith
the permission of the O\vner and not under a
claim of right. 1-lere all of the elernents required
to establish that presumption are present . . .
Plaintiff also produced direct evidence to the
effect that the co1nmission company considered
the use of that property as a roadway as permissive and not under a claim of right".
The Court then reversed the lower court, which had
held that there was an easement by adverse user. But,
"re have presented a much stronger case on this appeal,
by presenting evidence that eaeh ~{ear until 1951, the
plaintiff sought and obtained perrnission for the us~
of the ditch in question, and the Court and jury evidentl~· helieved this testimony. There was no such permission sought or given in the Cache \Talley Banking case.
Taking, again, the plaintiff's theory of the evidence,
the testimony of Melvin Buttars, brother of plaintiff,
there can be no doubt left as to the proper rule as
to the presumption to be indulged in here. '' Q. Is there
a culvert at the west end of the ditch~ . A_ . Yes. Q. Do
you know who placed that culvert therej? A. Father
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had it placed there . . . Q. Is your father

alive~?

A. No.

Q. \\Then did he die~ A. 1916. Q. Ho\v long has that ditch

been in existence'? A. Well, now, it's been there for
fifty years. Q. Have you ever observed the ditch being
used for ir1~igation purposes~ A. Yes. Q. What land was
it used to irrigate~ A. Those lots. Q. Which lots'? A.
·rhe ditch vvas used for the lots after they had got
them, they used them to water the east lot. Q. That'8
the plaintiff's lot now? A. Yes (tr. 45-46)." Whether
or not this testimony along with that of plaintiff, herself, is a correct state1nent of fact, it is binding on her.
If their version prevails, the presu1nption is against
the adverse user; if defendant's version prevails, the
easernent \vas never used adversely until 1951. Therefore, plaintiff cannot prevail under either theory.
In the tTtah ease of Buckley v. Cox 247 P. 2d 277,
this Court said:
''A presumption well established in this state
is that where a person opens a way for the use
of his own premises, and another person also
uses it without causing damage, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, such use by the latter is permissive, and not under a claim of right.
(several other Utah cases there cited). It was
defendant's burden to overcome this presumption
and to establish his claim by clear and convincing
evidence. This in the judgment of the lower
court,
failed to do.''

he

If we assume that the lower Court had held that
an easen1ent by prescription through adverse and hostile user, existed, it is firmly believed that this Court

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
\Vould be under the necessity of reversing the decision
for utter lack of evidence.

It i~ antieipated that counsel for plaintiff is laboring under the iu1pression that in Utah the early coinmon
la'" of presu1nption of a grant is followed. This is an
error as pointed out by this Court in the lJtah case of
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle 109 Ut. 213,
174 P. 2d 148 where it is said:
''But the co1n1non law went back one more step
and found that such use against (Court's italics)
and not ~under the owner or with his permission
"ras evidenee that the owner or his predecesors in
interest had granted the right of use ... It was
in order to get away fro1n that result that "\VP,
are no"\v holding that the English common la\v
in that regard does not apply to easements for
irrigation ditches in Utah.''
That was written in November, 1946. In December.
1946, thi~ Court then rendered its decision in the case
of Zollinger v. Frank, 175 P. 2d 714, and it was this
case that inspired the long annotation in 170 A. L. R.
770, beginning at p. 776. The Frank case is there listed
under the heading (p. 778) ''II. PREVAILING RlTLFJ.
a. Presumption of adverseness from lTse". It is most
likely that counsel falls into error by not distinguishing
the Frank case from the case at bar, and by failing to
take into account the Buckley case (supra) which was
decided on August 20, 1952, and Sdrales v. Rondos (Utah,
1949), 209 P. 2d 562.
rrhe case here presented as had a solid foundation
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in the laws of litah for n1any years ,as was very aptly
expressed jn the lTtah case of Jensen v. Gerrard,

;~!)

P. 2d 1070:
''A twenty year use alone tof a way is not sufficient to establish an easement. Mere u~e of
a roadway opened by a landowner for his own
purpose 'vill be presumed permissive. An antagnostic or adverse use of a way cannot spring
fron1 a permissive use. A prescriptive must he
acquired adversely. It cannot be adverse when
it rests upon a license or mere neighborly accomrnodation. Adverse user is the antithesis of
permissive user . . .
Since the defendants claimed the right to use the
roadway by prescription, the burden was upon
then1 to establish such claim by clear and satisfactory evidence.''
While the authority of the Utah Court sufficiently
supports the verdict of the jury and judgment, a very
recent California case is interesting for purposes of this
appeal. Arnold v. City of San Diego, 261 P. 2d 33:
''The questions of whether the use of an easement is adverse and under a claim of right, or
permissive and with the owner's consent, and
whether the nature of the user is sufficient to
put the owner on notice, are ordinarily question~
of fact, and all conflicts must be resolved in
favor of the prevailing party and the evidence
viewed in the light most favorable to him.''
For reasons stated in that case, it is felt that this
Court will view the evidence presented by defendants
most favorably to them. It should be remembered that
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9
jury went on the premises for a view.

They no

donbt, saw that there was a ditch to the South of plaintiff's property by the side-walk or path.
easil:·

~ee

They could

that plaintiff could as well use this ditch

a~

the one C'onrsing through the center of defendants' property: and the~v could easily see that the use of the ditch
through defendants' property \vas merely a neighborly
accornodation. If the Court views the evidence of defendant~· 1nost favorably to them, the only conclusion
that can be reached is that the use, until 1952, was perInissive.
POINT II
rrhe argu1nents on Point I above apply with equal
force to this point and are adopted on this point.
POINT III
In interrogatory No. 3, the Court below fully explained what \Vas rneant by the term "hostile". He said
that a 1nere neighborly accomodation would not avail
plaintiff. rr'hose are the words used by this Court in
Jensen v. Gerrard (supra) ; he told the jury that if the
use was by permission, or as a sisterly accomodation,
it could not be hostile. There is nothing which could
possibly confuse the jury. All the answers are consistent. The jury found in No. 1, a long use, but not a
hostile use. They found that the use had been open
and notorious, but not adverse or hostile, and that such
nse did not become hostile until 1952, when plaintiff
failed to gain consent to the use, and a dispute and
la"Tsuits gre'v out of their Mother's estate, with the
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parties to this case aligned against each other in tho~P
suits.

It is submitted that had the Court given the instruction set out in appellant's point III, and a verdict had
been against respondent, it would have been reversible
error as suggested in POINT I. Such an instruction
\vould have violated the rule laid down in the Buckley
ease, the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch case, the Cache
1
\ alley Banking Co. case (all Supra) and many other
lT tah cases.
There is no contention about the importance of the
use of water and \Vatervlays in this arid territory. Neither is there any question, as mentioned by counsel (p.
6 of the brief) on the matt~r of a resort to eminent
domain. The plaintiff's property when it was all owned
by the Father, was watered from the West to the East,
and there is a ditch in the front (South)· in present use,
and through \vhich plaintiff has a right to the use of,
and this is one of the things that the jury no doubt
noticed and placed much stress on. The son of defendant testified that there are ~o reasons why plaintiff
could not use this ditch on the side path. Defendants'
exhibit '' 1 '' is a plat of the properties in question.
The red '' B '' is the ditch in question. On the South
of the property is shown the original ditch and an arrow
leading into plaintiff's property is where the water
used to flow, and can and will flow (tr. 83). That was
the testimony of Wallace who had actually used this
route to put the water on the land plaintiff now owns.
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It was the son, Boyd ( tr. 88) who there testified
that plaintiff's husband came to him to ask if he could
put a ditch through the middle of the lot, and the boy
ref~ITed the husband to his Father. He is a trained engineer with the Soil Conservation, Department of Agriculture, and a graduate of the lTtah State Agricultural
College in Irrigation Engineering ( tr. 91), and failed
to see any reason why 'vater could not be put on plaintiff's property at point "Z".
Counsel lastly points to Holm v. Davis (Utah, 1912),
125 P. 403, as authority for the proposition that even
if in the beginning the use was by consent, it Inay ripen
into an easement by mere use only. This contention
lea-v·es out of the case here presented several important elements: (1) Consent was sought and had each
year, (2) Plaintiff never did treat the ditch as her own
as 'vas the case in the Holm case (supra), ( 3) Each year
defendant David Archibald gave his separate consent
(tr.118) because he knew that he may lose the right. to
object; and this continued from 1930 until 1951, ( 4) and
in 1946 Mr. Archibald completely plowed the ditch under
and planted alfalfa, and thereafter and before it was
again used by plaintiff, she again sought permission.
The Holm case is not in point, and it is submitted
that the lower Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GEO. D. PRESTON
Attorney for defendants
and respondents.
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